

Message Text

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SUBJECT: MBFR: LIMITATIONS ON ALLIANCE EQUIPMENT

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1. SET OUT BELOW ARE OUR VIEWS ON TACTICAL APPROACHES TO

PROTECTING ALLIED ARMAMENTS FROM LIMITATIONS THAT MIGHT BE IMPOSED ON US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE DRAFT GUIDANCE AND THE DRAFT SUPPLEMENT BUT MISSION MAY WHEN APPROPRIATE DRAW ON THIS MATERIAL IN EXPLAINING US THINKING AND IN SEEKING ALLIED ACCEPTANCE OF DRAFT GUIDANCE AND DRAFT SUPPLEMENT IN THEIR PRESENT FORM, PARTICULARLY IN ARGUING AGAINST FRG AND BELGIAN CHANGES TO PARA 5 OF DRAFT GUIDANCE.

2. MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILL ENTER A NEW AND IMPORTANT STAGE WHEN THE WEST PUTS FORWARD ITS OFFER TO WITHDRAW US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. COMBINED WITH AN OFFER TO COVER AIR MANPOWER, THIS PROPOSAL WILL ROUND OUT THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION AND SHOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING OUR FIRST PHASE GOALS.

3. HOWEVER, INEVITABLY THERE ARE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH A MOVE OF THIS IMPORTANCE. A WESTERN OFFER OF REDUCTIONS IN US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS COULD LEND WEIGHT TO EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD NEITHER BE IN THE US NOR THE ALLIANCE'S INTEREST, I.E., ON ARMAMENTS OF ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

4. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT IS QUITE LOGICAL FOR AN AGREEMENT INVOLVING ARMAMENTS--PARTICULARLY ARMORED AND NUCLEAR FORCES--AND AIMED AT ENHANCING STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO WEIGH MORE HEAVILY ON THE US AND USSR. THE US AND USSR MAINTAIN LARGE STOCKPILES OF ARMAMENTS OUTSIDE THE AREA THAT COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE CENTRAL FRONT, AND THE CONCENTRATION OF SOVIET ARMORED FORCES ALREADY IN THE AREA CONTRIBUTES TO THE DESTABILIZING CLIMATE FOR WHICH THE WEST SEEKS REDRESS THROUGH MBFR. LIKEWISE, THE US AND USSR WOULD HAVE SPECIAL ROLES IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE AREA BY THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES. CONSTRAINTS ON SELECTED US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS ARE TOLERABLE BECAUSE THEY AFFECT ONLY DEPLOYMENTS AND REQUIRE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SELECTED ARMAMENTS ONLY FROM A SPECIFIED AREA. DEPLOYMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LEVELS MAINTAINED BY THE US AND THE USSR ELSEWHERE ARE NOT AFFECTED.

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5. ON THE OTHER HAND, LIMITATIONS ON THE EQUIPMENT OF THE NATIONS LOCATED IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE A DIFFERENT ORDER OF SIGNIFICANCE. SUCH CONSTRAINTS WOULD AFFECT NOT JUST DEPLOYMENTS BUT THE TOTALITY OF ARMAMENTS THEIR FORCES CAN POSSESS. THIS PLACES A FAR HEAVIER SECURITY BURDEN ON STATES WITHIN THE REDUCTION AREA. THUS, ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE ALLIES OF THE US WOULD IMPOSE UNEQUAL AND UNACCEPTABLE OBLIGATIONS.

6. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE LONG CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD AVOID ANY COMMITMENT TO EXPLICIT LIMITS ON NON-US ARMAMENTS, WE HAVE STUDIED THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING A CASE THAT LIMITS ON MANPOWER OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OFFER ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE ALLIES WILL NOT CIRCUMVENT US PHASE I EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. THE FRG AND BELGIUM ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SUCH A FORMULATION. BUT AS WE ARGUED EARLIER (REFTEL), FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA THAT SUCH INDIRECT LIMITATIONS OFFER ADEQUATE ASSURANCE TO THE EAST COULD RISK UNFAVORABLE OR UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES FOR NATO. IN PARTICULAR, ASIDE FROM THE LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF MANPOWER AS A CONSTRAINT ON EQUIPMENT, QUESTIONS OF POTENTIAL EASTERN DROIT DE REGARD OVER EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE INVOLVED- INSTEAD, WE PROPOSED LANGUAGE (PARA 3, REFTEL) THAT MAKES CLEAR THAT THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS ON NON-US ALLIES WOULD BE THOSE RESULTING FROM COLLECTIVE LIMITS ON ALLIED AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

7. WE HAVE CONCLUDED FROM OUR STUDIES THAT, TACTICALLY, THE BEST WAY TO AVOID DISCUSSING LIMITS ON NON-US ARMAMENTS IS TO FOCUS ON THE US-SOVIET CHARACTER OF BOTH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT AND THE ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS, AND NOT TO ARGUE THAT AGGREGATE MANPOWER LIMITS PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION OF EQUIPMENT LIMITS. AS WE HAVE ARGUED (REFTEL) THE LATTER POSITION IS HARD TO DEFEND. MOREOVER, IT SUGGESTS THAT THE WEST RECOGNIZES AN OBLIGATION TO SATISFY EASTERN DEMANDS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT INCREASES.

8. OUR ULTIMATE ARGUMENT REMAINS, OF COURSE, THE WESTERN UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SUCH LIMITATIONS. IN SUPPORT OF AND AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THAT POSITION, WE CAN USE THE ARGUMENT

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MENT THAT LIMITS SHOULD APPLY ONLY TO THOSE US AND SOVIET SYSTEMS FOR WHICH LIMITS ARE SPECIFICALLY BARGAINED AND SPECIFIED IN AN AGREEMENT, BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL ROLE OF US AND SOVIET FORCES IN AFFECTING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS MIGHT BE SUPPLEMENTED BY THE ARGUMENT OF EQUITY (PARAS 4 AND 5), DIFFERENTIATING US AND SOVIET WITHDRAWALS FROM INDIGENOUS REDUCTIONS.

9. IT WILL BE OBSERVED THAT, IN A TACTICAL SENSE, THESE ARGUMENTS ARE ALL DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. THEREFORE, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL DO BEST TO DISCOURAGE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THEY SHOULD NOT THEMSELVES RAISE THE ISSUE OF ALLIED LIMITATIONS. ALTHOUGH THEY SHOULD DISPLAY NO HESITATION IN REFUTING EASTERN ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF LIMITATIONS ON NON-REDUCED EQUIPMENT,

THEY SHOULD RETURN ALWAYS TO THE POINT THAT THE EAST IS
GETTING OFF THE MAIN SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (REDUCTIONS
BY US AND SOVIET FORCES IN PHASE I, AND COMMON CEILING IN
PHASE II). KISSINGER

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